The Moral Compass: On Ethics, Justice, and the Good Society

Was Socrates truly trying to define justice, or was his goal something far more profound? This paper offers a fresh interpretation of Plato’s Republic, arguing that Socrates’s shifting and sometimes contradictory definitions of justice were not a sign of confusion, but a deliberate rhetorical strategy designed to awaken a deep and personal concern for virtue and human excellence in his audience.

Can we ever truly know what is right or wrong without some foundational beliefs? This essay tackles moral skepticism head-on by arguing that all forms of moral reasoning—from consequentialism to Kantianism—ultimately rely on the trustworthiness of at least some moral intuitions. It defends a “Minimal Moral Intuitionism” framework as a necessary precondition for any justifiable moral knowledge.

Are we morally responsible for actions we couldn’t avoid? This essay provides a sharp critique of the long-held Principle of Alternate Possibilities, which states that responsibility requires the ability to have done otherwise. It argues that an agent’s internal reasons for acting are more important than external circumstances, fundamentally shifting the criteria for how we evaluate moral judgment.

Is free will just an illusion created by factors beyond our control? This essay defends a libertarian concept of free will against the “hard luck” objection. It uses a unique and timely comparison between humans and large language models (LLMs) to argue that our intuitive sense of agency does not depend on the absence of external luck, offering a new framework for this classic debate.

Delve into the mind-bending realm of population ethics, where simple math can lead to a “repugnant conclusion” about creating vast populations with lives barely worth living. This essay takes a novel approach to this classic thought experiment, arguing that its core premise is theoretically impossible. It offers a new way to resolve the paradox and think about the ethics of large-scale policymaking.

Should we prioritize the needs of people who will live thousands of years from now over our own? This paper offers a timely critique of the increasingly popular philosophy of “longtermism.” It argues that its focus on the extremely distant future and low-probability existential risks can lead to a state of “policy paralysis,” preventing meaningful and necessary action in the present.